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RESURRECTING AN OLD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR A 
NEW WRONG: BATTERY AS A TOXIC TORT 
Christopher J. McAuliffe' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose a person develops a disease that frequently occurs among 
residents and workers in a certain polluted geographic area. Suppose 
further that this potential plaintiff, who recently has learned of his 
or her disease, no longer lives in the area or is a nonresident em-
ployee of the polluter. The diseased plaintiff, wanting to recover 
damages for the personal injury, turns to tort law for compensation. 
With most pollution-related injuries, however, the plaintiff has suf-
fered a harm that lacks the obvious signs of a direct, physical injury. 
The pollution has injured the plaintiff by causing a harm-the 
disease-that is not easily linked to the pollution. 1 A court may 
dismiss the injured plaintiff's tort action for personal injuries while 
granting recovery to those plaintiffs who have suffered property 
damage. 2 Alternatively, a court may deny recovery to all plaintiffs 
from the area because the polluter has complied with industry stan-
dards.3 Finally, the court may deny the plaintiff's request for per-
sonal injury damages because the contracted disease, even though 
it occurs at an alarming frequency in the particular area, lacks an 
obvious causal link to the polluter's emissions. 4 
This Comment examines the difficulties with which plaintiffs in 
hazardous substance litigation must contend when they seek to re-
cover personal injury damages under traditional tort actions and 
• Editor in Chief, 1992-1993, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
) See infra part II. 
2 See Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 4 N.W.2d 435,438 (Iowa 1942). 
• See, e.g., Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders, 528 F.2d 1107, 1125 (7th Cir. 1976) (operator 
of junk automobile shredder entitled to reasonable period of time to conform to industry 
standards). 
4 See, e.g., Stockdale v. Agrico Chern. Co., 340 F. Supp. 244, 259 (N.D. Iowa 1972). 
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under workers' compensation systems. This Comment then considers 
the tort of battery as an alternative for plaintiffs who wish to recover 
personal injury damages for hazardous substance injuries. Section 
II of this Comment discusses the obstacles plaintiffs must overcome 
when they attempt to win compensation for their toxic injuries 
through the tort system.5 Although courts have begun to accept 
innovative liability theories in order to take account of the problems 
of causation and latent harm that often defeat hazardous substance 
suits, plaintiffs still have trouble recovering personal injury dam-
ages. Section III analyses the traditional toxic torts of trespass, 
nuisance, negligence, and strict liability and how courts apply these 
torts in hazardous substance litigation for the recovery of personal 
injury damages. 6 Section IV examines workers' compensation sys-
tems and how these systems apply to workers with hazardous sub-
stance injuries. 7 In Section V this Comment considers the common 
law tort of battery and how plaintiffs have used this tort in hazardous 
substance litigation.8 This Comment concludes that the problems 
associated with using trespass, nuisance, negligence, strict liability, 
and workers' compensation in hazardous substance litigation may 
make battery a more successful cause of action when the plaintiff is 
seeking to recover personal injury damages. 9 
II. THE COURTS' RESPONSE TO HAZARDOUS 
SUBSTANCE INJURIES 
In the modern world, plaintiffs complain of personal mJuries 
caused by hazardous substances. 1o With approximately five million 
organic and five hundred-thousand inorganic chemical substances in 
existence and ten thousand new chemical substances synthesized 
every year, the potential for a chemical substance to harm someone 
is great.ll 
5 See infra notes 10-62 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 63-159 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 160-93 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 194-256 and accompanying text. 
9 See supra notes 256-338 and accompanying text. 
10 The term "hazardous substance", as used in this Comment, includes any substance or 
mixture that presents a danger to health or safety, including a substance that is an irritant, 
or that is toxic, corrosive, or flammable, or that generates pressure through decomposition, 
heat, or other means. 2 J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDHALL, MODERN TORT LAW LIABILITY & 
LITIGATION § 28.01, at 833 (rev. ed. 1989). 
11 Stanley M. Pier et aI., Recognition and Evaluation of Hazards, in TOXIC TORTS 1, 2 
(G.Z. Nothstein ed., 1984). 
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When one of these hazardous substances causes a personal injury, 
the injured person can recover damages through either a "toxic tort" 
claim,12 or a workers' compensation system. 13 A toxic tort claim is 
an action for damages from hazardous substances based on tradi-
tional tort theories. 14 For example, plaintiffs have litigated toxic tort 
actions under the common law tort theories of trespass, 15 nuisance, 16 
negligence,17 strict liability,18 and battery. 19 
Workers' compensation is a statutory system through which em-
ployees, injured in workplace accidents, can recover personal injury 
damages from their employers without having to prove their em-
ployers' fault.20 Through workers' compensation, employees receive 
automatic compensation for work-related injuries in exchange for 
waiving their right to bring tort-based personal injury claims against 
their employer. 21 
A. The Problem of Latent Harms in Hazardous 
Substance Litigation 
Hazardous substance litigation poses many problems that are not 
frequently issues in standard litigation.22 One such problem is the 
time delay between a plaintiff's exposure to a hazardous substance 
and the plaintiff's manifestation of harm from the exposure.23 The 
12 See infra part III. 
13 See infra part IV. 
14 See G.Z. Nothstein, Workers' Compensation and the Exclusivity Doctrine, in TOXIC 
TORTS, supra note 11, at 147-48. 
16 See, e.g., Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528, 1540 (D. Kan. 1990) (plaintiffs 
sued chemical plant in trespass for damages from chemicals falling on their farm). 
16 See, e.g., Page v. Niagara Chern. Div., 68 So.2d 382,383-84 (Fla. 1953) (railroad workers 
sued chemical plant in public and private nuisance for damages from defendant's hazardous 
gases). 
17 See, e.g., Davis v. Du Pont, 729 F. Supp. 652, 653-54 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (plaintiff sued 
paint manufacturer in negligence action for personal injury damages from defendants' paint 
products). 
18 See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1531-32 (D.C. Cir.), cm. 
denied 469 U. S. 1062 (1984) (plaintiff sued insecticide manufacturer in strict liability for failure 
to warn plaintiff of dangers from defendant's insecticide). 
19 See, e.g., Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 715 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (plaintiffs 
sued university in battery for damages from DES). 
20 See Nothstein, supra note 14, at 148. 
21 See Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916, 917 
(198O) [hereinafter Occupational Disease]. 
22 See LEE & LINDHALL, supra note 10, § 28.01, at 834. The term "hazardous substance 
litigation" in this Comment refers to both toxic tort litigation and workers' compensation 
claims for injuries caused by hazardous substances. 
23ld.; see also Resha M. Putzrath et al., Occupational and Environmental Exposures, in 
TOXIC TORTS, supra note 11, at 68; Allan Kanner, Emerging Conceptions of Latent Personal 
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time between the exposure and the toxic effect-often referred to 
as the latency period-may be from ten to thirty years. 24 This latency 
period makes it difficult for plaintiffs to prove that a defendant's 
activity caused their harm because many other possible causes may 
have occurred in the time between the defendant's activity and the 
plaintiff's harm. 25 
Because this latency period is longer than most statutes of limi-
tations for personal injuries, many states have adopted so-called 
"discovery rules" that delay the accrual of a cause of action until 
after a plaintiff discovers his or her injury.26 Courts have applied 
these discovery rules only in personal injury cases, not in property 
damage cases.27 
In further recognition of the problem of latent harm, some courts 
and commentators have recognized an exception to the claim preclu-
sion rule for toxic torts.28 Under the traditional claim preclusion 
rule, courts bar plaintiffs from bringing a second claim against a 
defendant for a latent disease that did not manifest itself until after 
the completion of the first suit.29 Under the revised claim preclusion 
rule, toxic tort plaintiffs would be able to recover damages for a 
subsequent injury that the defendant's activity caused, even if the 
plaintiff already had recovered from the defendant for a different 
claim arising out of the same activity. 30 
Injuries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 343, 346--48 (1987); Palma J. Strand, 
Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: the Example 
of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN L. REV. 575, 583-86 (1983). For 
the purposes of this Comment, the term, "plaintiff(s}" includes both toxic tort plaintiffs and 
injured workers claiming damages under a workers' compensation system. Likewise, the term 
"defendant(s}" includes both toxic tort defendants and employers in workers' compensation 
claims. 
24 Putzrath et al., supra note 23, at 68. 
26 See, e.g., Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 301 (N.J. 1987). 
26 Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1606 (1986) 
[hereinafter Developments]. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 580 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (state statute of limitation does not start running until plaintiff, by exercising 
reasonable diligence, should have known she might have cancer from smoking); CAL. LAB. 
CODE § 5412 (West 1989) (for workers' compensation claims, date of injury for occupational 
disease is date worker, through exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known disability 
was from employment). 
Z7 See, e.g., Corporation of Mercer Univ. v. National Gypsum Co., 368 S.E.2d 732, 733 (Ga. 
1988), em. denied 493 U.S. 965 (1989). 
28 See, e.g., Ayers, 525 A.2d at 300 (N.J. 1987). See generally Note, Claim Preclusion in 
Modern Latent Disease Cases: A Proposal for Allowing Second Suits, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1989, 1990, 1993 (1990) [hereinafter Claim Preclusion]. 
29 Claim Preclusion, supra note 28, at 1989. 
30 Id. at 1990; see, e.g., Ayers, 525 A.2d at 300. 
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B. The Problem of Causation in Hazardous Substance Litigation 
Although discovery rules and a modified claim preclusion rule may 
help plaintiffs in toxic tort and workers' compensation actions by 
allowing time for their harms to become manifest, plaintiffs still must 
prove that their exposure to the defendant's hazardous substance 
caused their harm. 31 This causation requirement mandates that plain-
tiffs identify both the substance that caused their alleged harm and 
the party who released the hazardous substance. 32 
1. Identifying the Substance that Caused the Harm 
The long latency period between the exposure to the hazardous 
substance and the resulting disease makes establishing a cause-and-
effect relationship particularly difficult for toxic tort plaintiffs.33 Haz-
ardous substances often cause diseases that do not appear until many 
years after the initial exposure.34 When the plaintiff's disease does 
manifest itself, it is often indistinguishable from naturally occurring 
diseases or from the effects of other hazardous substances the plain-
tiff may have encountered since exposure to the defendant's hazard-
ous substance. 35 
Plaintiffs traditionally have established a causal link between their 
harm and their exposure to a particular hazardous substance through 
data gathered from tests on laboratory animals and from epidemio-
logical records on the incidence of disease in the affected geographic 
area. 36 Plaintiffs can show that a defendant's hazardous substance 
caused their disease by showing that an increase in the amount of 
the substance in a certain area increases the incidence of disease in 
that area. 37 
31 See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 301; see also Warren J. Hurwitz, Environmental Health: An 
Analysis of Available and Proposed Remedies for Victims of Toxic Waste Contamination, 7 
AM. J.L. & MED. 61, 70-73 (1981); Develo'[J'YYU3nts, supra note 26, at 1617; Strand, supra note 
23, at 583-86. 
32 Developments, supra note 26, at 1617. 
33 Ayers, 525 A.2d at 301; see also Putzrath et aI., supra note 23, at 69; see supra notes 23-
25 and accompanying text. 
S4 See Z. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: A COURSEBOOK ON NATURE, 
LAW AND SOCIETY 182 (1992). 
36 I d.; Resha M. Putzrath et al., The Diagnosis of Occupational or Environmental Illness 
& Injury, in TOXIC TORTS, supra note 11, at 105 [hereinafter Putzrath, Diagnosis]; Devel-
opments, supra note 26, at 1618. 
36 John S. Forstrom, Victim Without a Cause: the Missing Link Between Compensation 
and Deterrence in Toxic Tort Litigation, 18 ENVTL. L. 151, 156-57 (1987). 
37Id. at 157. 
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The tests required to prove the causal nexus between a plaintiff's 
exposure and its disease, however, are often expensive and time-
consuming.38 Detecting latent, chemically induced diseases requires 
sophisticated testing that must continue over a long period of time. 39 
Tragically, the individuals who experience the most severe toxic 
exposures often are the least able to afford these medical and sci-
entific costs.40 
Recently, courts faced with toxic tort litigation have begun to 
accept theories of liability that allow plaintiffs to recover damages 
without having to satisfy the traditional causal nexus between ex-
posure and disease.41 In some jurisdictions, plaintiffs have recovered 
emotional distress damages for "cancerphobia."42 Such plaintiffs 
must prove that they have a reasonable, serious fear of contracting 
cancer from their exposure. 43 They also must prove that the defen-
dant caused their exposure and is legally responsible for the expo-
sure.44 Successful plaintiffs will recover compensation for their fear 
of contracting cancer, but not necessarily compensation for the can-
cer itself. 45 
In addition, in some jurisdictions, plaintiffs can recover the costs 
of medical monitoring.46 In an action for medical monitoring dam-
ages, a plaintiff can recover the costs of medical examinations even 
though it can not prove that the threatened disease will occur.47 To 
establish a claim for medical monitoring costs, the plaintiff must 
38 Leslie S. Gara, Article, Medical Surveillance Damages: Using Common Sense and the 
Common Law to Mitigate the Dangers Posed by Environmental Hazards, 12 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 265, 278 (1988). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 292. For example, the people who experience the highest exposure to formaldehyde 
are generally those who live in trailers. Id. at 292, n. 115 (citing Dworkin, Fear of Disease 
and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A Solution or a Pandora's Box?, 53 FORDHAM L. 
REVIEW 527, 571-72 (1984». 
41 In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, [1991] 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
20184, 20195 (3d. Cir. Sept. 20, 1990, amended Oct. 29, 1990 and Nov. 23, 1990); see also D. 
Alan Rudlin, Burdens of Proof, in TOXIC TORTS, supra note 11, at 451--52, 473. 
42 In re Paoli, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,195; see also Rudlin, supra note 41, at 475-77. 
43 In re Paoli, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,195; see also Rudlin, supra note 41, at 475-77. 
44 Rudlin, supra note 41, at 476, citing Arnett v. Dow Chemical Co., slip op. 82-901S (Sup. 
Ct. Cal. Mar. 211983). The ''legally responsible" element requires that there is an independent 
basis of liability in tort. I d. 
45 See In re Paoli, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,195; Rudlin, supra note 41, at 476. 
46 See, e.g., In re Paoli, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,205 (plaintiffs exposed to defendant's PCBs 
allowed to recover medical monitoring damages); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 
313 (N.J. 1987) (plaintiffs entitled to damages for costs of medical surveillance).See generally 
Gara, supra note 38, at 279-85. 
47 Gara, supra note 38, at 281. 
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prove that the defendant tortiously exposed him or her to a hazard-
ous substance.48 This exposure must have caused the plaintiff to 
suffer an increased risk of contracting a serious, latent disease. 49 
Medical examinations must be reasonably necessary, and there must 
exist procedures for early detection and treatment of the disease. 50 
Although these innovations enable plaintiffs to recover certain 
types of damages, they do not provide personal injury damages for 
a plaintiff's actual disease. 51 To recover personal injury damages for 
their diseases, plaintiffs still must identify both the substance that 
caused the harm and the defendant that caused the harm. 52 
2. Identifying the Defendant that Caused the Harm 
Plaintiffs in hazardous substance litigation have difficulty identi-
fying the particular party that released the hazardous substance that 
allegedly caused their disease. 53 Many hazardous substances take the 
form of fairly generic products. 54 Moreover, substances may combine 
synergistically with other substances in the air, ground, or water to 
produce new and more dangerous compounds. 55 Linking the original 
substance to a particular defendant is made even more difficult by 
the multitude of different producers, anyone of whom could have 
produced the substance that caused the plaintiff's harm. 56 
In linking a particular defendant to a plaintiff's harm, courts have 
altered and expanded traditional theories of liability, thereby easing 
the plaintiff's burden of proof. 57 Under an alternative liability theory, 
for example, courts hold defendants liable until they eXCUlpate them-
selves. 58 Other related theories include the "concerted action" the-
48 In re Paoli, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,196. Although the Third Circuit Court in Paoli stated 
that the defendant's actions that caused the exposure must be negligent, it is possible that 
non-negligent activity could also give rise to medical monitoring damages. See id.; cf. Gara, 
supra note 38 at 267 (negligent or other tortious defendants should be liable for medical 
monitoring damages). 
49 In re Paoli, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,196; Ayers, 525 A.2d at 312. 
50 In re Paoli, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,196. 
51 See supra notes 42--50 and accompanying text. 
52 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. 
53 Forstrom, supra note 36, at 155; Developrnents,supra note 26, at 1624. 
54 Developments, supra note 26, at 1625. 
55 Forstrom, supra note 36, at 155. 
66 See Rudlin, supra note 41, at 477. 
57 See, e.g., Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305, 1313 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1980) (burden shifted to joined manufacturers of DES to exculpate themselves from liability); 
see also Lynn E. Pollan, Theories of Liability, in TOXIC TORTS, supra note 11, at 329. 
58 See, e.g., Ferrigno, 420 A.2d at 1313 (burden shifted to joined manufacturers of DES to 
eXCUlpate themselves from liability); see also, Pollan, supra note, 57, at 331-32. 
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ory, the "enterprise liability" theory, and the "market share liability" 
theory. 59 Courts have used these theories of liability where anyone 
of a number of potential defendants, all of whom produce the same 
generic product, could have caused the plaintiff's harm. 60 
The tort system has expanded to take account of the recent in-
crease in chemical production and the accompanying increase in 
personal injuries from hazardous substances. 61 Proving causation, 
however, is still a substantial bar for plaintiffs seeking to recover 
personal injury damages under any of the traditional toxic torts. 62 
III. THE TRADITIONAL TOXIC TORTS 
A. The Property Torts as Toxic Torts 
Trespass and nuisance causes of action address interferences with 
a plaintiff's property interest.63 Because many toxic tort plaintiffs 
own property and sue defendants in trespass or nuisance for the 
property damage that accompanies their personal injuries, this sec-
tion will discuss briefly these two property torts. 
1. Trespass as a Toxic Tort 
Trespass is an intentional interference with a person's possession 
of property.64 To succeed in an action in trespass, a plaintiff must 
show that the defendant intentionally entered its property, either in 
person or through some agent or instrumentality.65 When the entry 
59 See, e.g., Hall v. E.!. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp 353, 376-78 (E.D.N.Y. 
1972) (to establish enterprise liability, plaintiffs must demonstrate defendants' joint awareness 
of risks and their capacity to reduce or affect risks); Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924, 
937 (Cal.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (each defendant held liable for proportion of 
judgment represented by share of market for DES); Bichler v. Eli Lilly and Co., 436 N.E.2d 
182, 188 (1982) Gury inferred concerted action from evidence of consciously parallel behavior 
that defendant and other DES manufacturers agreed not to test the drug on mice before 
marketing and encouraged other manufacturers to do the same); see also Pollan, supra note 
57, at33~3. 
60 See, e.g., Sindell, 607 P.2d at 928-88. Courts have applied these theories of liability in 
very limited circumstances. [d. Yet, courts developed these theories to meet the novel legal 
challenges posed by latent injuries caused by mass produced drugs, much in the same way 
that courts are now faced with the legal challenges posed by latent injuries from exposure to 
hazardous substances. [d. The expanding nature of tort law theory does not bar recovery 
merely because the claim is novel. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 4 (5th ed. 1984). 
61 See supra notes 26~0, 41-50, 57-60 and accompanying text. 
62 Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 301 (N.J. 1987). 
63 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 13, at 77, § 86, at 617. 
64 [d., § 13, at 70. 
66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
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is by an instrumentality, such as discarded refuse or waste water, 
the plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally acted in such 
a way that the reasonably foreseeable result of that action was an 
invasion of the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff also must show that 
such an invasion did result. 66 Finally, the invasion must have affected 
the plaintiff's right to exclusive possession of property by causing 
substantial damage to the plaintiff's property. 67 
Trespass causes of action, however, have severe limitations. Some 
jurisdictions require that the invading instrumentality have greater 
substance than smoke, dust, gas, or fumes. 68 In Ryan v. City of 
Emmetsburg,69 for example, the plaintiff brought a nuisance action 
complaining of the stench invading his property from the defendant's 
neighboring sewage treatment plant.70 In dicta, the Iowa Supreme 
Court interpreted trespass to encompass only physical invasions by 
tangible matter.71 Because many hazardous substances are intangi-
ble-taking the form of smoke, dust, gas, or fumes-the application 
of a traditional trespass cause of action may pose considerable prob-
lems to potential plaintiffs. 72 
Moreover, an action in trespass does not help a plaintiff who does 
not have exclusive possession of real property.73 The property inter-
est element of trespass would bar claims by plaintiffs who do not 
possess the land that the defendant allegedly invaded. 74 
2. Nuisance as a Toxic Tort 
Similar to a trespass cause of action, a nuisance cause of action 
also protects property interests. 75 Plaintiffs can bring nuisance ac-
66 Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979). 
67Id. 
68 See, e.g., Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528, 1540 (D. Kan. 1990) (chem-
icals falling on neighboring farm did not support a trespass action for even nominal damages); 
Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 4 N.W. 2d 435, 438 (Iowa 1942) (trespass requires actual 
physical invasions by tangible matter); see also Jay Zinns, "Close Encounters of the Toxic 
Kind"-Toward an Amelioration of Substantive and Procedural Barriers for Latent Toxic 
Injury Plaintiffs, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 822, 831 (1981). 
69 4 N.W. 2d 435 (Iowa 1942). 
7°Id. at 437-38. 
71Id. at 438. 
72 Zinns, supra note 68, at 833. 
73 See Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979); Developments, supra 
note 26, at 1610. 
74 See Borland, 369 So. 2d at 529.; see also, Margaret Z. Johns & Richard A. Seltzer, Toxic 
Torts: Theories of Liability, in PREPARATION AND TRIAL OF A COMPLEX TOXIC CHEMICAL 
OR HAZARDOUS WASTE CASE 1986317,334 (1986). 
75 RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 821D. 
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tions, however, to protect public as well as private interests in 
property. 76 
a. Public Nuisance 
A public nuisance is a substantial or unreasonable interference 
with the public's interest in real property.77 The public's interest in 
real property includes personal health, safety, and use of the land. 78 
For a private citizen to bring a public nuisance action, the citizen 
must have suffered a harm, resulting from the defendant's activity, 
that is different in kind-not just in degree-from the harm the 
public at large has suffered. 79 
Some courts may not allow plaintiffs to recover for personal in-
jUries in public nuisance.80 In one case, Page v. Niagara Chemical 
Division,81 railroad workers sued a neighboring chemical plant in 
public nuisance to recover damages for the personal injuries they 
sustained when the plant released hazardous gases.82 Because all 
members of the public would have suffered from the defendant's 
toxic emissions in the same way as the plaintiffs did, however, the 
Florida Supreme Court dismissed the workers' public nuisance 
claim. 83 
b. Private Nuisance 
Private nuisance addresses intentional or unreasonable interfer-
ences with an individual's use and enjoyment of its private prop-
erty.84 In determining whether an alleged interference is compens-
able, courts typically consider whether the interference's harm 
outweighs the utility of the defendant's activity.85 They also may 
consider whether the defendant could continue the activity after 
compensating the plaintiff for the harm.86 In addition, in this bal-
76 KEETON ET AL., supra note 50, § 86 at 618. 
77 Id. 
78 Id., § 90, at 643-44. 
79 RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, at § 821C. See, e.g., Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del Webb 
Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706 (Ariz. 1972) (plaintiff's loss of sales was a special injury entitling 
him to sue). 
so See Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 4 N.W.2d 435, 438 (Iowa 1942) (actions for bodily 
injuries in public nuisance actions are not allowed). 
81 68 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1953). 
82 Id. at 383. 
83 Id. at 384. 
84 RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 822. 
86 Id. § 826. 
Il8 Id. 
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ancing of burdens and benefits, courts often consider the character 
of the neighborhood in which the nuisance occurs. 87 
Because a nuisance is an invasion of property, plaintiffs who do 
not possess a property interest in the burdened land cannot bring 
suit for private nuisance.88 The railroad workers in Page v. Niagara 
Chemical Division89 also sued the defendant chemical plant on a 
private nuisance claim for personal injuries caused by the plant's 
release of hazardous gases. 90 Because the workers did not have a 
property interest in the land that the emission affected, the court 
denied them recovery under private nuisance. 91 
Purely personal injuries are not a compensable harm under a 
private nuisance theory because the private nuisance cause of action 
exists to compensate for harms resulting from interferences with an 
individual's use and enjoyment of land. 92 In George v. Standard Slag 
CO.,93 the residents of an area surrounding a slag plant sued the 
plant in nuisance for the air pollution that the plant generated.94 The 
Kentucky Supreme Court set aside a jury verdict for the plaintiffs 
because the jury considered the plaintiffs' personal injury in deter-
mining the amount of damages to award. 95 According to the court, 
evidence of personal injury is admissible only to show how the nuis-
ance effects property value. 96 
In determining if a plaintiff has suffered a compensable injury, 
courts may consider the character of the neighborhood where the 
nuisance occurs and the value of the offensive activity to society. 97 
tn See, e.g., George v. Standard Slag Co., 431 S.W.2d 711, 715 (Ky. 1968) (in detennining 
if defendant was liable under nuisance cause of action, court instructed jury to consider 
importance and influence of defendant's factory, respective situations of parties, and character 
and development of neighborhood), overruled in part by, Southeast Coal Co. v. Ed Combs, 
760 S. W.2d 83, 84 (Ky. 1988). 
88 See, e.g., Page v. Niagara Chern. Div., 68 So.2d 382, 384 (Fla. 1953) (railroad workers 
without possessory interest in employer's property not allowed to recover in private nuisance); 
see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 821E. 
89 68 So. 2d 382. 
90 [d. at 383-84. 
91 [d. at 384. The court also denied the plaintiffs' claim under a public nuisance theory. See 
id. 
92 See, e.g., Brown v. Petrolane Inc., 162 Cal. Rptr. 551, 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (plaintiffs 
failed to allege perceptible injury to property interests from activity of neighboring liquefied 
petroleum gas facilities). 
93 431 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. 1968), overruled in part by, Southeast Coal Co. v. Ed Combs, 760 
S. W.2d 83, 84 (Ky. 1988). 
94 [d. at 712. 
95 [d. at 713-14. 
96 [d. at 716. 
!11 See, e.g., id. at 715 (jury instructed to consider importance and influence of defendant 
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In Rove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp. ,98 for example, the defendant 
installed a coke oven that spewed steam, gas, and dirt particles onto 
the plaintiff's neighboring property.99 Complaining of damage to her 
property, her health, and her family's health, the plaintiff sued the 
defendant corporation in nuisance. 100 The New York Supreme Court, 
however, denied the plaintiff's claim for relief, reasoning that even 
though the plaintiff moved into the area first, when it was a hickory 
grove, the region "was never fitted for a residential district."101 
Because plaintiffs recognize that they usually can recover only 
property damages in nuisance actions,102 they sometimes add claims 
in negligence or strict liability to recover personal injury damages. 
B . Negligence as a Toxic Tort 
Plaintiffs traditionally have used a negligence cause of action in 
personal injury cases. loa In order to make out a prima facie case of 
negligence, a plaintiff must show that the defendant owed him or 
her a duty of reasonable care, and that the defendant breached this 
duty. 1M The plaintiffs must also show that the defendant's breach 
caused the plaintiff's actual harm.105 
The determination of whether the defendant owed a duty of rea-
sonable care to the plaintiff requires a balancing test. Courts must 
balance the probability that an accident will occur, the severity of 
harm from that accident, and the cost to prevent the accident. 106 
This balancing requires a court to undertake a sophisticated study 
of the technology available to avert the accident, the cost of this 
technology, and the effectiveness of the technology in preventing 
such accidents. 107 
The difficulty of demonstrating the defendant's duty of reasonable 
care was shown in Dillon v. Acme Oil Co./os where a neighboring 
landowner sued an oil refinery for negligently contaminating the 
factory, respective situations of the parties, and character and development of the neighbor-
hood). 
98 258 N.Y.S. 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932). 
99 [d. at 230. 
100 [d. at 231. 
101 [d. at 233-34. 
102 See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text. 
103 PLATER, supra note 34, at 136. 
104 RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 291; WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATE-
RIALS ON TORTS 136 (8th ed. 1988). 
106 RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 291; PROSSER ET AL., supra note 104, at 136. 
106 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
107 See Developments, supra note 26, at 1611-12. 
lOB 2 N.Y.S. 289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1888). 
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plaintiff's well. 109 The defendant spilled oil that seeped into the soil 
on its land and contaminated the groundwater that flowed into the 
plaintiff's well. 110 The court considered it unreasonable to expect the 
oil refinery to foresee, at the time of the spills, that the oil would 
soak through the ground and contaminate the groundwater. 111 Con-
sequently, according to the court, the plaintiff could not recover 
under negligence for the contamination of his well, because the 
defendant's pollution did not constitute a breach of its duty of rea-
sonable care. 112 
Once a plaintiff has shown that a defendant breached the duty of 
reasonable care, the plaintiff also must identify both the chemical 
that caused the injury and the defendant that discharged the chem-
ical. ll3 For example, in Greyhound Corp. v. Blakely,114 the plaintiff 
sued the defendant for injuries she sustained as a result of carbon 
monoxide poisoning she suffered while riding on the defendant's 
bus. 115 The plaintiff could prove that carbon monoxide from the 
defendant's bus caused her harm because she exhibited symptoms 
of carbon monoxide poisoning during the bus ride, and because her 
physician confirmed the poisoning soon after the trip.116 Plaintiffs 
rarely are able to satisfy the causation requirement this easily. 
Problems of disease latency, linking a common disease to a partic-
ular substance, and identifying a single responsible defendant from 
a field of possible defendants makes proving causation difficult for 
the plaintiff bringing a negligence cause of action in hazardous sub-
stance litigation. 117 The problems with proving causation are dem-
onstrated clearly in Davis v. DuPont.ns In Davis, the plaintiff 
painted cars at automobile repair shops for twenty-five years: an 
occupation that exposed him to various toxic fumes from the defen-
dants' paint products. 119 The plaintiff sued the defendants in negli-
gence, alleging that the fumes from the defendants' paint products 
caused his liver damage. 12o The United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Iowa granted the defendants' motion for sum-
109 [d. at 289. 
110 [d. at 290. 
III [d. at 291. 
112 [d. at 291-92. 
113 Developments, supra note 26, at 1617. 
114 262 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1958). 
115 [d. at 403-04. 
116 [d. 
117 See supra notes 22--56 and accompanying text. 
118 729 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Ark. 1989). 
119 [d. at 653. 
120 [d. at 653-54. 
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mary judgment because the plaintiff could show neither that he was 
exposed to the substance known to cause liver damage nor that his 
exposure to one of the defendants' products caused his injury. 121 
Traditionally, plaintiffs have been able to use the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine to show that a particular defendant caused their harm. 122 
Res ipsa loquitur allows a jury to infer the defendant's liability 
where the plaintiff has shown both that his or her harm is of a type 
that usually does not occur without someone's negligence, and that 
there are no other possible contributing causes. 123 Plaintiffs probably 
will not be able to invoke the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in hazardous 
substance litigation because of the many different substances that 
could have caused the plaintiff's disease. 124 Typically, the toxic tort 
plaintiff will be unable both to exclude all other potential causes and 
show that his or her disease results from a particular defendant's 
negligence. 125 
Even when a plaintiff establishes both the defendant's duty and 
causation, the plaintiff's negligence action is still susceptible to a 
wide range of defenses. For example, a court can completely bar a 
plaintiff's negligence cause of action where the plaintiff's own neg-
ligence contributed to the accident126 or where the plaintiff assumed 
the risk of the accident. 127 A plaintiffs' negligence also may reduce 
his or her recovery from a defendant under the theory of comparative 
negligence. 128 In Yates v. Norton CO.,129 for example, a worker wear-
ing a gas mask died after breathing the fumes in a varnish holding 
121Id. at 655. Although the plaintiff's doctor was able to testify that toxic agents caused 
the plaintiff's liver damage, she was unable to testify that the defendant was responsible for 
the toxic agents. Id. at 654. 
122 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 328D. 
123 Id. Res ipsa loquitur creates an inference of negligence when the plaintiff shows the 
event ordinarily does not occur without someone's negligence or fault; other responsible causes, 
including the acts of third parties, are sufficiently eliminated; and the plaintiff did not con-
tribute to the injury. Id. 
124 See Zinns, supra note 68, at 837. 
126 See id., at 836-37. 
126 See RESTATE!'4ENT, supra note 65, § 467. "Contributory negligence is conduct on the 
part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he should conform for his own 
protection, and which is a legally contributing cause co-operating with the negligence of the 
defendant in bringing about the plaintiff's harm." Id., § 463. 
127 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 496A. Assumption of the risk requires risk of harm 
to the plaintiff caused by the defendant; the plaintiff has actual knowledge of the risk and 
appreciates its magnitude; and the plaintiff voluntarily chooses to stay within the area of risk. 
Id., § 496C. 
128 See generally PROSSER ET AL., supra note 104, at 577-78 (discussing the application of 
comparative negligence theories in different jurisdictions). 
129 525 N.E.2d 1317 (Mass. 1988). 
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tank. 130 When the worker's administratrix sued the mask's manufac-
turer in a negligence action, the trial court instructed the jury that 
any improper use of the gas mask by the deceased would lead to a 
verdict for the defendant. 131 Although the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court reversed the trial court because of this improper jury 
instruction, the court did note that the deceased's improper use of 
the respirator could raise the issue of comparative negligence and 
reduce the plaintiff's recovery.132 
Although plaintiffs traditionally have used negligence actions to 
recover damages for personal injuries, the tort is poorly suited for 
use in hazardous substance litigation. Plaintiffs using negligence as 
the basis for a toxic tort action must prove that the defendant's 
activity was unreasonable and caused the plaintiff's latent, nonspe-
cific disease. 133 Some, though not all, of these difficulties are elimi-
nated under strict liability. 
C. Strict Liability as a Toxic Tort 
Under a strict liability theory, a person engaged in an "abnormally 
dangerous" activity may be liable for harms resulting from that 
activity regardless of fault. 134 When deciding whether an activity is 
abnormally dangerous courts will consider the activity's risk of harm 
to others, the gravity of that potential harm, and the defendant's 
inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care. 135 
Courts also will consider the activity's commonness in that particular 
community, the activity's appropriateness in that particular com-
munity, and the activity's value to that community.136 
Courts examine the individual circumstances of each case to de-
termine whether they should apply strict liability to a defendant's 
activity.137 Activities that warranted strict liability in a certain com-
munity at a certain time may no longer warrant such liability because 
of an advance in technology or a change in location to an area where 
130 Id. at 1318-19. 
131 I d. at 1321. 
132 Id. 
133 See supra notes 103-25 and accompanying text. 
134 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 519. 
135 Id., § 520. 
136 Id.; see, e.g., Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 274 (Utah 1982) (facts 
supported application of strict liability because of defendant's abnormally dangerous dumping 
activity and inappropriate use of land). 
137 See Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854,869 & n.16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), citing 
Clinic & Hospital, Inc. v. McConnell, 236 S. W. 2d 384, 391 (Mo. App. 1951). 
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the activity is either safer or more common. 138 In some circum-
stances, the legislature or executive branch of government already 
may have decided questions of the activity's degree of risk and its 
appropriateness to the community in which it is conducted. 139 In 
Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc.,140 the Missouri Court of Appeals noted 
that the defendant could oppose the imposition of strict liability on 
its radiopharmaceutical processing plant by arguing that the federal 
licensing process already had determined that the plant's social ben-
efit outweighed the social risk. 141 
In toxic tort cases, plaintiffs use strict liability theory to recover 
damages for personal injury where it is too difficult to prove the 
defendant's negligence. 142 In Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical CO.,143 
the family of a deceased agricultural research center worker sued 
an insecticide manufacturer in strict liability for failure to warn 
consumers of the dangers from the insecticide. 144 Although the de-
cedent was overweight, suffered from high blood pressure, and had 
a sinus problem, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia 
upheld the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff.145 The court rea-
soned that a jury could reasonably conclude that the insecticide's use 
fulfilled the elements of strict liability and caused the death. 146 
Courts do not always consistently apply strict liability standards 
to the same activity.147 In Branch v. Western Petroleum,148 the Su-
preme Court of Utah held the defendant oil company strictly liable 
for the damage caused by its stored waste water.149 In Turner v. 
Big Lake Oil CO.,150 however, the Supreme Court of Texas did not 
consider the defendant's storage of waste water to be an ultrahazar-
dous activity for which courts should hold defendants strictly lia-
ble. 151 
138 See Bennett, 698 S. W.2d at 868, n.14. 
139 See id. at 869, n.17. 
140 698 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App. 1985). 
141 [d. at 869, n.17. 
142 See PLATER, supra note 34, at 134. 
143 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). 
144 [d. at 1531~2. 
145 [d. at 1532, 1543. 
146 See id. at 1539. 
147 Compare Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218,223 (Wash. 1977) (aerial crop spray-
ing found abnormally dangerous) with SKF Farms v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 
905-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (court refused to decide if crop dusting was ultra hazardous). 
148 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982). 
149 [d. at 275. 
150 96 S. W.2d 221 (Tex. 1936). 
151 [d. at 226. 
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In addition to the problems associated with establishing a strict 
liability cause of action, there are also limitations on the type of 
damages a plaintiff can recover. A plaintiff in a strict liability suit 
can recover damages only for the type of harm that makes the 
defendant's activity abnormally dangerous. 152 In hazardous sub-
stance litigation, however, plaintiffs usually have difficulty linking 
their harm to a particular activity.153 Thus, plaintiffs using a strict 
liability theory in hazardous substance litigation are faced with the 
problem of proving that the defendant's activity is abnormally dan-
gerous because of the type of harm that they have suffered, even 
though there may be no direct, causal nexus between their harm 
and the defendant's activity.154 In addition, this restriction on dam-
ages often will make consequential, economic, and punitive damages 
unrecoverable. 155 
Although strict liability actions allow plaintiffs to recover damages 
from defendants without proving the defendants' fault, there are 
other restrictions on the cause of action. Plaintiffs must be able to 
prove that the defendant's activity is abnormally dangerous and that 
this activity caused their harm. Despite strict liability's innovations, 
many tort plaintiffs still may be unable to recover personal injury 
damages. 
IV. THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM 
The workers' compensation system attempts to remedy the diffi-
culties workers experience in trying to recover personal injury dam-
ages from their employers for work-related injuries through tort 
law. 156 The system, however, fails to compensate adequately those 
workers who contract occupational diseases. 157 
A. A Brief History of Workers' Compensation 
Workers were unable to recover from their employers at common 
law for workplace injuries because of the common law defenses 
152 RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 519(2); see, e.g., Kenny v. Scientific, Inc., 497 A.2d 
1310, 1327-28 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (haulers of toxic waste not strictly liable for 
damage caused by waste after delivery). 
153 See supra notes 31--57 and accompanying text. 
154 See Zinns, supra note 68, at 843. 
155 Johns & Seltzer, supra note 74, at 333. 
156 See Occupational Disease, supra note 21, at 917. 
157 See generally id. at 916-25; see also Charles C. Caldart, Are Workers Adequately Com-
pensated for Injury Resulting from Exposure to Toxic Substances?, in CHEMICAL SAFETY 
REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE 92, 92-98 (Homburger & Marquis, eds., 1985). 
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available to employers. 158 For example, courts denied recovery to 
workers under the "fellow servant" doctrine by declaring that work-
ers were responsible for their co-workers' negligence because they 
should have known of and reformed the bad work habits of their 
fellow employees. 159 Under the assumption of the risk defense, courts 
would deny recovery to workers who complained of their dangerous 
working conditions but continued to work out of fear of losing their 
jobs. 160 Finally, under the contributory negligence defense, courts 
rejected the claims of workers who contributed in some way to the 
cause of their injuries. 161 The effectiveness of these defenses resulted 
in only fifteen percent of injured workers recovering personal injury 
damages from their employers, even though the nature of the work 
or the employer's negligence caused seventy percent of the work-
place accidents. 162 
In an effort to avoid the injustices that resulted from these easy 
defenses to employee tort claims, states adopted workers' compen-
sation statutes. 163 Workers' compensation statutes guarantee em-
ployees compensation without requiring the employee to prove the 
employer's negligence or fault. 164 To receive this compensation, 
workers must show that their injury arose out of and in the course 
of employment. 165 
This guaranteed compensation, however, is not without cost. The 
workers' compensation system sets the amount of compensation at 
a level below that which a worker-plaintiff could recover in tort 
law. 166 This lower amount of compensation is in exchange for the 
158 See JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE, 1900-1918 at 
41 (1968). 
169 [d. A court denied a day shift steel worker who was killed when a new employee on the 
night shift negligently plugged an open hearth. [d. at 41-42. 
160 [d. at 42. A court denied a worker's claim for damages when her arm was torn off by 
the exposed gears of a machine after she complained to her employer about the danger. [d. 
See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text. 
161 WEINSTEIN, supra note 158, at 42. A court denied a railroad engineer's claim for damages 
for injuries resulting from a train accident. The engineer had fallen asleep after working thirty 
hours straight under threat of losing his job if he stopped working. [d. 
162 [d. at 41. 
163 See Nothstein, supra note 14, at 148. 
164 [d. 
166 [d. A minority of workers' compensation statutes drop the "arising in the course of 
employment" requirement and only require that the injury occur in the course of employment. 
[d. at 149. 
166 See L. Boden, Workers' Compensation, cited in NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CHARLES C. 
CALDART, TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT 455,456 (1991); Occupa-
tional Disease, supra note 21, at 925. Recovery under workers'compensation is often lower 
than recovery under a tort theory because workers' compensation does not award damages 
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swift and guaranteed recovery the system promises. 167 In addition, 
in exchange for guaranteed compensation, employees give up their 
right to sue their employers in tort actions. 168 Workers' compensation 
is the exclusive remedy for injured workers, thereby barring em-
ployees from bringing costly tort actions against their employers for 
injuries sustained as a result of accidents in the usual course of 
business. 169 This "exclusivity" provision bars injured workers from 
suing their employers in negligence and potentially recovering the 
higher compensation available under tort law. 170 
B. The Application of Workers' Compensation to 
Hazardous Substance Injuries 
Approximately 390,000 new cases of occupational disease and 
100,000 deaths from occupational disease occur every year. l7l Work-
ers' compensation statutes apply to employees' claims against their 
employers for occupational diseases allegedly caused by exposure to 
hazardous substances in the work place. 172 The workers' compensa-
tion system, however, breaks down when confronted with the prob-
lems of causation and disease latency.173 
Injured workers have difficulty proving that their diseases arose 
from work place conditions because occupational diseases are vir-
tually indistinguishable from diseases that occur outside the work 
place. 174 Because workers' compensation systems compensate in-
jured employees only for injuries caused by workplace activity, many 
employees do not recover damages when it is difficult to prove that 
their work conditions, and not an intervening factor, caused their 
disease. 175 This uncertainty regarding causation leads employers to 
challenge two out of three occupational disease claims. 176 Diseased 
for pain and suffering and because disability payments are often much less than lost income. 
Boden, supra, at 456. 
167 See Occupational Disease, supra note 21, at 919, 925. 
168 See id. at 917. 
169 Nothstein, supra note 14, at 148-49. 
170 Nothstein, supra note 14, at 151. The exclusivity provision of workers' compensation 
acts may also bar other non-intentional causes of action. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Anchor 
Hocking Corp., 558 So.2d 93, 96-97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (dismissing workers' strict 
liability claims but allowing the intentional tort claims). 
171 See Nothstein, supra note 14, at 150. 
172 Occupational Disease, supra note 21, at 916. 
173 See Caldart, supra note 157, at 94. See generally Peter S. Barth, A Proposal for Dealing 
with the Compensation of Occupational Diseases, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 570-73 (1980). 
174 See supra part II.E. (discussing problem of causation in tort system). 
175 See Barth, supra note 173, at 572; Occupational Disease, supra note 21, at 922. 
176 Occupational Disease, supra note 21, at 923. 
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workers injured by hazardous substances are successful in winning 
compensation in less than one-third of the estimated number of 
hazardous substance fatalities and in only one-thirteenth of the es-
timated number of disabling occupational diseases. 177 
In addition, the long latency period of many occupational diseases 
makes damages for these diseases unrecoverable under some work-
ers' compensation systems. 178 Because of the possibility of interven-
ing causes during the latency period, it is difficult for plaintiffs to 
pinpoint the cause of their disease. 179 In addition, statutes of limi-
tations in some workers' compensation acts bar claims for latent 
diseases that do not manifest themselves within a specified period 
of time after the last day the claimant worked for the defendant 
employer. 180 
Finally, some workers' compensation statutes require that an em-
ployer have exposed a plaintiff employee to the hazardous substance 
for a specified length of time. 181 This mandatory period of exposure 
is often much longer than the time necessary to enable an occupa-
tional disease to develop from an exposure to the hazardous sub-
stance. 182 Because of these limitations in the workers' compensation 
system, few claims for hazardous substance diseases enter the sys-
tem, and even fewer claims win any compensation. 183 
When an injured employee's workers' compensation claim suc-
cessfully surmounts the problems of causation and latency, the dam-
ages awarded to the employee do not fully compensate the em-
ployee. l84 Many workers' compensation systems replace less than 
forty percent of wages lost due to injury.185 In fact, a Syracuse 
University study has found that seventy-two percent of wage loss 
from workplace injuries went uncompensated, with workers' com-
pensation providing recovery for only nine percent of total wage 
177 I d. at 925. 
178Id. at 924; Barth, supra note 173, at 572. 
179 Barth, supra note 173, at 572. See supra part II.A. (discussing problem of latent disease 
in the tort system). 
180 Occupational Disease, supra note 21, at 924. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, 
§ 189 (West 1989). 
181 Occupational Disease, supra note 21, at 923. See, e.g., !CAN. STAT ANN. § 44-5alO (1986). 
182 See Occupational Disease, supra note 21, at 923. The specified length of time for exposure 
is often five to ten years. Exposure to beryllium, however, has caused an occupational disease 
in one worker after only two months of exposure. Exposure to asbestos for even one day can 
increase the risk of cancer. Id. at 923-24 & n.59. 
183 I d. at 925. 
184 Caldart, supra note 157, at 93. 
185 Occupational Disease, supra note 21, at 925. 
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loss. 186 Moreover, because compensation is calculated at the worker's 
last wage rate, workers who develop an occupational disease several 
years after they worked may see years of inflation reduce their 
compensation payment to almost nothing.187 
Workers' compensation statutes enable injured employees to re-
cover damages without having to resort to tort law. 188 When applied 
to occupational disease, however, these statutes still require the 
injured party to overcome the same difficulties of causation and 
latent disease that plaintiffs encounter when proceeding under one 
of the traditional torts. 189 
V. BATTERY AS A TOXIC TORT 
The battery cause of action addresses the personal indignities 
resulting to one person from another's wrongful acts. l90 Today, bat-
tery compensates victims for nonconsensual violations of their inter-
est in physical security and bodily integrity.191 The essence of a 
battery cause of action continues to be an offense to personal dig-
nity.192 Battery's focus on bodily invasions makes the tort uniquely 
adapted to hazardous substance injuries. 
In order to establish a prima facie case for battery, a plaintiff 
must show that the defendant intended to cause a harmful or offen-
sive touching, and that such an offensive contact occurred. 193 Defen-
dants act with the intent requisite for a battery action not only when 
they intend to cause a harmful or offensive contact to the plaintiff 
or a third person, but also when they intend only to cause the 
apprehension of such a contact. l94 The contact the defendant causes 
does not have to be direct physical contact, but can be the result of 
the defendant putting some force into motion that causes the con-
tact. 195 The plaintiff does not even have to be conscious of the contact 
when it occurs.196 Therefore, plaintiffs can fulfill this extended con-
186 Caldart, supra note 157, at 93. 
187 Occupational Disease, supra note 21, at 925. 
188 See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text. 
189 See supra notes 175-91 and accompanying text. 
190 See Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F.Supp. 915, 931 (N.D. Ohio 1980). 
191 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, §§ 13, 18, 19. 
192 RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 18 cmt. c. 
193 Id. § 18. 
194 KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 9, at 39. 
195 Id. § 9, at 40. 
196 Id. § 9, at 40. 
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tact requirement when the defendant sets out poisoned food for the 
plaintiff to eat. 197 
These broad definitions of intent and contact allow plaintiffs to use 
battery as a toxic tort. Although a court may be reluctant to rec-
ognize this novel approach to toxic tort liability,198 the expanding 
nature of tort law does not bar recovery merely because the claim 
is novel. 199 Despite the fact that plaintiffs rarely use battery in 
environmental torts, the traditional tort of battery is well suited to 
hazardous substance litigation because it provides liability any time 
an actor intentionally causes another to come into contact with an 
offensive foreign substance. 200 
A. Intent 
Plaintiffs satisfy the intent element of a battery cause of action 
when they show that the defendant acted in a manner that was 
substantially or virtually certain to bring about an injury.201 For 
example, in Werlein v. United States202 the defendant, a munitions 
producer, dumped highly toxic substances into sandy ground above 
a regional aquifer.203 Reasoning that there was sufficient evidence to 
show that the defendant knew the dumping activity was substan-
tially certain to cause an offensive contact between the hazardous 
substances and the area's residents, the United States District Court 
for the District of Minnesota denied the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment. 204 
Undoubtedly, proving intent is the most difficult aspect of a toxic 
battery claim. This difficulty, however, is not as arduous as it may 
appear at first blush. The intent element of a battery cause of action 
does not require that the defendant specifically intended to cause 
the resulting harm.205 In a battery action, plaintiffs must show only 
that the defendant intended to bring about a contact between the 
197 [d. 
198 See, e.g., Adelung v. Township of Jackson, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1118, 1132 (D. N.J. 
1982). 
199 KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 1, at 4. 
200 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 18 cmt. c. 
201 Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So.2d 93, 96-97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 8A. 
202 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990). 
203 [d. at 907. 
204 [d. 
205 See, e.g., Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 718 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
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substance and a person.206 In Mink v. University o/Chicago,207 the 
defendant administered diethylstillbestrol (DES) to the plaintiffs as 
part of a medical experiment.208 According to the court, the defen-
dant's intention to administer DES to the plaintiffs was sufficient to 
satisfy the intent element of the plaintiffs' battery action.209 In other 
words, the plaintiffs satisfied the intent element without showing 
that the defendant intended to cause their harm.2lO 
While there are no cases on point, there is no reason why, under 
modern tort law, a defendant's intent not to act could not be the 
basis of a battery cause of action.211 Intent refers to the deliberate-
ness of the actor's conduct.212 In Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach 
Corp.,213 an employer failed to hire specialists to clean up a poly-
chlorinated biphenyl (PCB) spill and instead ordered his employees 
to do the job.214 The court determined that, in deciding how to clean 
the spill, the employer had an opportunity to make a conscious choice 
from several possible courses of action. Therefore, according to the 
court, a jury would be able to conclude that the employer possessed 
the requisite intent for a battery cause of action when he chose not 
to hire the experts. 215 
Courts, however, will not infer intent every time someone is hurt. 
The plaintiff still must show some conduct on the part of the defen-
dant. 216 In Hennessy v. Commonwealth Edison Company,217 for ex-
ample, the plaintiff, contaminated by radiation, sued the operator of 
a nuclear power station in battery.218 Although the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recognized that a 
battery action could address such an intentional offensive contact, 
206 [d. 
207 460.F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
208 [d. at 715. 
zoo [d. at 718. 
210 [d.; see also, e.g., Barber v. Pittsburg Corning Corp., 529 A.2d 491, 501 (Pa. Super. 
1987), rev'd on other grounds, 555 A.2d 766 (1989) (intent in asbestos suit satisfied even though 
defendant may not have actually desired the resulting harm). 
211 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 14, cmt. c. See generally, e.g., David B. Ezra, Note, 
Srrwker Battery: An Antidote to Second-Hand Srrwke, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1090-92 
(1990) (intent element of battery satisfied where smoker continues to smoke after being told 
to stop). 
212 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 8A. 
213 890 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1989). 
214 [d. at 196. 
216 [d. at 196-97. 
216 See, e.g., Hennessy v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 764 F. Supp. 495, 507 (N.D. Ill. 1991) 
(worker failed to explain event that led to his radiation contamination). 
217 764 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
218 [d. at 496. 
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the court granted the defendant summary judgment because the 
plaintiff failed to allege with particularity what intentional act led to 
his exposure.219 
B. Offensive Contact 
To prove the second element of a battery cause of action, a plaintiff 
must show that the defendant's intentional conduct constituted a 
harmful or offensive touching.220 This touching may be either direct 
physical contact between the plaintiff and the defendant or indirect 
physical contact between the plaintiff and an instrumentality con-
trolled by the defendant.221 For example, plaintiffs have sued defen-
dants on the basis of contact with asbestos dust,222 radiation,223 toxic 
waste,224 and various chemicals.225 A battery cause of action focuses 
on the fact that a touching has violated the plaintiff's interest in 
dignity and bodily integrity, not the method of touching. 226 
In hazardous substance litigation, a violation of bodily integrity 
can occur when the hazardous substance comes into contact with the 
plaintiff's internal organs.227 That is, the touching element of a bat-
tery cause of action occurs when the plaintiff suffers an exposure to 
toxic chemicals.228 Medical observation, however, cannot always de-
termine whether an individual has suffered a toxic exposure. 229 Plain-
tiffs can show that they have suffered a touching by offering as 
219 [d. at 507. 
220 RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 18. 
221 See, e.g., Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 718 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (act of 
administering drug supplied contact with plaintiff's person); see also RESTATEMENT, supra 
note 65, § 18 cmt. c. 
222 See, e.g., Barber v. Pittsburg Corning Corp., 529 A.2d 491, 498-99 (Pa. Super. 1987), 
rev'd on other grounds, 555 A.2d 766 (1989). 
223 See, e.g., Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854,857 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), eert. 
denied, 476 U. S. 1176 (plaintiffs sued radiopharmaceutical processing plant in battery for 
exposure to radioactive emissions). 
224 See, e.g., Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 907 (D. Minn. 1990) (plaintiff sued 
in battery for exposure to toxic waste). 
226 See, e.g., Barth v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 661 F. Supp. 193, 195 (N.D. Cal. 
1987) (plaintiff sued in battery for exposure to Benzene, heavy metal compounds and other 
industrial toxins); Martin v. Granite City Steel Div. of Nat. Steel, 607 F. Supp. 1430, 1431 
(S.D. Ill. 1985) (plaintiffs sued steel manufacturer for intentionally exposing them to toxins 
and carcinogens); Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So.2d 93,94,95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1990) (plaintiffs sued glass manufacturer in battery for exposure to toxic substances 
used in glass manufacturing process). 
226 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 18 cmt. c, § 19. 
227 See, e.g., Ezra, supra note 211, at 1093 (advocating a battery cause of action when second 
hand cigarette smoke enters the body). 
228 Carl B. Meyer, The Environmental Fate of Toxic Wastes, The Certainty of Harm, Toxic 
Torts, and Toxie Regulation, 19 ENVTL. L. 321, 350 (1988). 
229 [d. at 351. 
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evidence chemical analyses of the substance, that take into account 
the plaintiff's sensitivity to the substance, the duration of the ex-
posure, the concentration of the substance, and the method of ex-
posure. 230 Plaintiffs also can satisfy battery's touching requirement 
by demonstrating that the defendant exposed them to a hazardous 
substance at concentrations greater than the legally established 
threshold limits for exposure.231 In Gulden,232 the plaintiffs showed 
that they had suffered an offensive touching by offering evidence 
that they worked in a room that had a PCB level greater than the 
standards the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
set.233 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
found a reasonable jury could conclude that this evidence was suffi-
cient to show that the plaintiffs had suffered the harmful contact 
necessary for recovery under a battery cause of action. 234 
Plaintiffs do not have to prove physical injury to satisfy the harm-
ful contact element of a battery cause of action.235 A plaintiff only 
needs to show that the defendant's action caused an alteration of his 
or her body.236 The essence of a battery cause of action is an offense 
to an individua1's dignity from an invasion of that individua1's person, 
not the physical harm done to the body.237 In Bennett v. Mallinck-
rodt, Inc.,238 plaintiffs sued the defendant nuclear plant in battery 
for damage caused by the defendant's radiation striking their bod-
ies.239 Although the complaint made only a vague statement of the 
resulting damage, it withstood a motion to dismiss.240 Under a bat-
tery theory, proof of an intentional, offensive bodily invasion-even 
if it is completely harmless-entitles the plaintiff to an award of 
nominal damages.241 Plaintiffs do not have to demonstrate the extent 
of their injury with as great a degree of certainty as the degree of 
proof plaintiffs must use to show the defendant caused their harm. 242 
230 [d. at 350-5l. 
231 [d. at 351-52. 
232 890 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1989). 
233 [d. at 196. 
~[d. 
235 See id. at 273 (no need for physical harm to recover for an injury in tort law). 
236 RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 15 cmt. a; see, e.g., Barth v. Firestone Tire and Rubber 
Co., 661 F. Supp. 193, 196 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (plaintiff claimed injury to immune system without 
showing clinically diagnosed symptoms). 
237 RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 18 cmt. c. 
238 698 S. W. 2d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). 
239 [d. at 857. 
240 [d. at 865. 
241 [d. at 865, n.9; KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 9, at 40. 
242 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 912 cmt. a. Proof of causation is governed by a 
reasonable certainty standard. [d. 
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Although it is true that, in the modern world, some contact is 
unavoidable, and that therefore courts assume plaintiffs have con-
sented to ordinary contacts, toxic touching is not an ordinary con-
tact.243 The potential severity of the disease that could result from 
a toxic contact makes the contact more than one of the inconveni-
ences that citizens of a modern industrial society must bear. 244 
c. Damages 
As noted, plaintiffs can recover nominal damages under a battery 
cause of action for intentional, offensive invasions of their bodies, 
with or without harm.245 Plaintiffs also can recover punitive damages 
under a battery cause of action.246 Courts award punitive damages 
where defendants desired to harm the plaintiffs or where the defen-
dants knew that their actions were substantially certain to cause 
harm.247 Because battery actions usually involve matters with the 
worst kind of intentions, a battery cause of action frequently justifies 
punitive damages. 248 
Punitive damages not only punish defendants but also can com-
pensate plaintiffs for otherwise noncompensable injuries.249 Recov-
ering damages for otherwise noncompensable injuries is particularly 
important in suits in which the monetary value of the personal injury 
is difficult to measure accurately or effectively compensate.250 In 
such cases, plaintiffs can base their claim for punitive damages on 
their recovery of nominal damages.251 Punitive damages are available 
even in toxic tort cases where the court has not settled fully the 
issue of actual compensatory damages. 252 
243 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 9, at 42. 
244 Gara, supra note 38 at 281. 
246 See supra notes 239-46 and accompanying text. 
246 See, e.g., Peete v. Blackwell, 504 So.2d 222,223 (Ala. 1986) (plaintiff recovered punitive 
damages for slap on arm); Fowler v. Mantooth, 683 S. W.2d 250, 251--52, 254 (Ky. 1984) (plaintiff 
recovered punitive damages for punch). 
247 Arthur F. Roeca, Darrw,ges, in TOXIC TORTS, supra note 11, at 516. 
248 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 9, at 40. 
249 See id., § 2, at 9; see also Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of 
Punitive Darrw,ges, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982). 
260 See Ellis, supra note 249, at 30. 
251 See, e.g., Peete v. Blackwell, 504 So.2d 222,223 (Ala. 1986) (one dollar nominal damage 
award sufficient to support ten thousand dollar punitive damage award in battery action); see 
also KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 2, at 14; Griffin B. Bell & Perry E. Pearce, Punitive 
Darrw,ges and the Tort System, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 1,6, 11 (1987). 
252 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1184, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1988) 
("District court need not defer its award of punitive damages prior to determining compen-
satory damages for the entire class"). 
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Because of disease latency, plaintiffs in toxic tort actions base 
their personal injury and punitive damage claims on the defendant's 
activity from many years ago. 253 The defendant must take the jurors 
back to the time the injury-causing activity occurred and make them 
forget all that they now know of the dangers of hazardous sub-
stances. 254 It is difficult to set aside the modern jury's awareness of 
environmental pollution and health hazards and make them agree 
with the defendants' course of conduct. 255 
Although often overlooked as a toxic tort, battery is uniquely 
suited to hazardous substance litigation. In fact, the tort's simple 
prima facie case and amenability to punitive damages may allow 
plaintiffs to recover damages under a battery cause of action where 
they would be unsuccessful using another cause of action. 
VI. WHERE THE STANDARD THEORIES OF RECOVERY FAIL, 
A BATTERY CAUSE OF ACTION SUCCEEDS 
A. Battery as a Solution to Toxic Tort Problems 
One of the most difficult aspects of any toxic tort action is proving 
that a certain hazardous substance caused the plaintiff's harm. 256 
The harms experts associate with hazardous substances usually man-
ifest themselves after a long latency period.257 When such a harm 
does manifest itself, it typically takes the form of a disease that 
either occurs naturally or has many possible causes. 258 Without an 
identifiable causal link between the substance and the disease, the 
plaintiff may be unable to recover personal injury damages for his 
or her disease. 259 
Battery, however, may relieve plaintiffs of the need to prove that 
a particular toxic substance caused their disease. 26o The body's com-
ing into contact with certain substances by itself can constitute an 
253 Roeca, supra note 247, at 519-20. 
254 See id. at 520-21. 
255 See id. at 520-21. Most courts in asbestos litigation allowed the juries, with their knowl-
edge of the dangers of asbestos and the number of asbestos injuries, to determine whether 
the defendant's conduct in the 1930s and 1940s amounted to a conscious disregard for safety 
necessary to justify imposing punitive damages in the 1980s. See id. at 520. 
256 See supra notes 33--53 and accompanying text. 
257 See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
258 See Putzrath et al., supra note 23, at 105; Developments, supra note 26, at 1618. 
259 See supra part II. 
260 The difficulties plaintiffs encounter in trying to prove their disease's causation partially 
justifies a cause of action that provides damages after exposure but before manifestation of 
the symptoms of the disease. See Gara, supra note 38, at 275. 
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injury.261 This injury, even without proof of harm, may entitle plain-
tiffs in battery actions to a justification of their legal rights by an 
award of nominal damages. 262 Courts may award nominal damages 
in a battery action once a plaintiff proves that the defendant's inten-
tional activity caused the plaintiff's body to come into contact with 
a hazardous substance-the court does not have to wait for the 
plaintiff to demonstrate a causal link between his or her disease and 
the invading substance. 
Nominal damages, however, will not cover future medical bills or 
otherwise compensate a plaintiff for pain and suffering. Punitive 
damages, on the other hand, may compensate the plaintiff for these 
otherwise noncompensable injuries. 263 The intentional nature of the 
activity giving rise to the battery, and the invasion of bodily integrity 
make a battery cause of action more likely to result in a punitive 
damage award than a cause of action claiming a non-intentional 
harm. 264 
A skillful description of the severity of the plaintiff's injuries could 
encourage a jury to award punitive damages. 265 With the public's 
increased hostility towards environmental offenses,266 the jurors 
could see the defendant's activity as reflecting the conscious and 
deliberate disregard of others necessary for an award of punitive 
damages. 267 Jurors' fear of cancer, combined with recent juries' in-
creasing tendency to impose large verdicts against businesses and 
other institutional defendants268 could result in the plaintiff winning 
a large damage award. 269 The plaintiff could use this money to pay 
the medical costs for the harm that he or she could not link causally 
261 See, e.g., Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890 F.2d 195, 196 (1989) (exposure to PCB 
levels greater than EPA standards held sufficient to constitute injury). 
262 See Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854,865 n.9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); see also 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 9, at 40. 
263 See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text. 
264 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 2 at 10-11, § 9 at 40-41. 
265 See Gary T. Schwartz, Comment, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of 
Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 152 (1982). 
266 Steven L. Humphreys, Comment, An Enemy of the People: Prosecuting the Corporate 
Polluter as a Common Law Criminal, 39 AM. D.L. REV. 311, 313 (1990). According to a 
1986 study, the public considers industrial criminal polluters to be worse than armed robbers. 
Judson W. Starr, Countering Environmental Crimes, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 379,379 
n.1 (1987). 
267 See Roeca, supra note 247, at 520. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 2, at 
9-10. 
268 See Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute for 
Criminal Justice's Research, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 478, 491 (1987). 
269 See Rudlin, supra note 41, at 463. 
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to the exposure. The mere threat of punitive damages in connection 
with a cause of action that usually produces them, such as battery, 
may be sufficient to promote a large settlement offer or possibly a 
concession regarding liability. 270 
In addition to nominal and punitive damages, plaintiffs in battery 
actions also may be able to recover damages for "cancerphobia" and 
medical monitoring. 271 Battery can serve as the underlying theory 
of liability for both cancerphobia and medical monitoring damages. 272 
Although cancerphobia and medical monitoring damages do not com-
pensate plaintiffs for their disease, they do provide some measure 
of recovery where causation is too difficult to prove. 273 
Furthermore, plaintiffs who are able to prove a causal nexus 
between their disease and the defendant's activity after they have 
recovered other damages in a previous suit may be able to recover 
personal injury damages for the latent disease under a modified claim 
preclusion rule. 274 Because a plaintiff does not have to allege actual 
harm to recover under a battery cause of action, he or she may be 
able to sue the defendant immediately after exposure to the hazard-
ous substance and win a justification of their legal rights through an 
award of nominal damages.275 By suing at this early stage, the plain-
tiff will be able to discover evidence of the defendant's liability that 
might otherwise be lost by the time the plaintiff's latent disease 
manifests itself. 276 Years later, when the disease does manifest itself, 
the plaintiff already will have proven the defendant's liability, 
thereby avoiding the problem of stale evidence and enabling the 
plaintiff to recover personal injuries.277 
Thus, plaintiffs in battery actions can recover damages both in 
those jurisdictions that recognize innovative methods of recovery in 
toxic tort cases278 and in traditional jurisdictions that allow for pu-
nitive damages.279 By enabling plaintiffs to recover damages without 
having to prove causation, battery surmounts the primary problem 
that all plaintiffs encounter when seeking to recover personal injury 
270 See Schwartz, supra note 265, at 134, n.6. 
271 See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text. 
272 See supra notes 44, 48 and accompanying text. 
273 See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text. 
274 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
275 See Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854,865 n.9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); see also 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 9, at 40. 
276 See Developments, supra note 26, at 1612. 
277 See Claim Preclusion, supra note 28, at 2007. 
278 See supra notes 28-30,42-47 and accompanying text. 
279 See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text. 
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damages under any theory of liability in hazardous substance liti-
gation. 
B. Battery as a Solution to the Problems of 
Trespass and Nuisance 
Battery is particularly effective as an alternative to the property 
torts of trespass and nuisance in actions for personal injury damages. 
Both trespass and nuisance actions address invasions of real prop-
erty.28O A trespass is an intentional invasion of the plaintiff's right 
to exclusive possession of real property.281 A nuisance is an inten-
tional or unreasonable invasion of the plaintiff's right to use and 
enjoy real property.282 A battery cause of action addresses bodily 
invasions and is thus better adapted to the recovery of personal 
injury damages. 283 
To be successful in a trespass or nuisance suit, plaintiffs in haz-
ardous substance litigation must own property that the defendant 
has harmed either by invading the land with some substantial 
instrumentality284 or by unreasonably interfering with the plaintiff's 
use and enjoyment of the land.286 These property interest require-
ments exclude plaintiffs who lack a possessory interest in the prop-
erty at issue.286 Plaintiffs who do not discover their injury until after 
they have moved from the affected land may not be able to recover 
under nuisance or trespass. Because these unfortunate plaintiffs no 
longer own the property the defendant invaded, they no longer have 
a claim under the property-based torts. A similar fate befalls those 
plaintiffs who, due to the bad luck of being in the wrong place at the 
wrong time, are harmed by a toxic discharge while on someone else's 
property. Hazardous substances do not differentiate in their choice 
of victims between those with a property interest and those with-
out. 287 
In addition, courts in trespass and nuisance actions may require 
that the invading agent have a tangible substantiality,288 or that the 
280 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 50, § 13, at 77, § 86, at 617. 
281 See id., § 13, at 70. 
282 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 822. 
283 See supra part V. 
284 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 158. 
286 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 822. 
286 See supra notes 72-74, 88-96 and accompanying text. 
287 See Zinns, supra note 68, at 851. 
288 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
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interference with the plaintiff's land be unreasonable.289 Many haz-
ardous substances lack immediately tangible qualities yet still cause 
harms.290 Moreover, the reasonableness standard under nuisance 
allows courts to consider the character of the affected neighborhood 
in deciding whether the plaintiff deserves compensation.291 An activ-
ity that courts would consider a nuisance in one neighborhood might 
not be a nuisance in a less aesthetically appealing neighborhood. As 
a result, lower income neighborhoods may find it more difficult to 
enjoin a nuisance or win damages. 292 
A battery action does not require the plaintiff to own property, 
nor does it require the defendant's invasion of the plaintiff's body 
to be substantial or unreasonable.293 Because plaintiffs in battery 
actions do not have to hold a possessory interest in land, they may 
be able to recover for their personal injuries without owning land. 294 
Battery focuses on invasions of a person's right of bodily integrity, 
not any property right. 295 
Battery's focus on bodily integrity rather than property rights 
opens up avenues of recovery that courts deny to plaintiffs suing 
under a property-based tort. Plaintiffs may be more likely to recover 
damages for psychic injuries such as emotional distress and mental 
anguish in a battery cause of action because there is an accompanying 
physical impact or injury.296 Courts may be reluctant to award dam-
ages for psychic injuries in trespass and nuisance actions that lack 
evidence of a physical impact. 
Finally, because battery is not concerned with what touched the 
plaintiff, only with the fact that the plaintiff has been touched, it 
289 See supra notes 84-87, 97-101 and accompanying text. 
290 See, e.g., Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 907 (D. Minn. 1990) (plaintiff sued 
in battery for exposure to toxic waste); Barth v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 661 F. Supp. 
193, 195 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (plaintiff sued in battery for exposure to benzene, heavy metal 
compounds, and other industrial toxins); Martin v. Granite City Steel Div. of Nat. Steel, 607 
F. Supp. 1430, 1431 (S.D. Ill. 1985) (plaintiffs sued steel manufacturer for intentionally 
exposing them to toxins and carcinogens); Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So.2d 
93, 94, 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (plaintiffs sued glass manufacturer in battery for exposure 
to toxic substances used in glass manufacturing process); Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 
S.W.2d 854,857 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), em. denied, 476 U.S. 1176 (plaintiffs sued radiophar-
maceutical processing plant in battery for exposure to radioactive emissions). 
291 See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text. 
292 See, e.g., Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 256 N.Y.S. 229, 233--M (N.Y. App. Div. 
1932) (court denied plaintiff's claim for relief under nuisance cause of action because her 
neighborhood was "never fitted for a residential district"). 
293 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 18. 
294 See supra part V. 
295 See supra part V. 
296 See Roeca, supra note 247, at 506-07. 
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may be the more successful cause of action in those circumstances 
where the plaintiff has been harmed by some intangible substance. 297 
This is particularly important in toxic tort where many of the harmful 
substances are not immediately detectable. 298 
c. Battery as a Solution to the Problems of Negligence 
The cornerstone of a negligence suit is the plaintiff's proof that 
the defendant breached a duty of reasonable care that it owed to the 
plaintiff. 299 Determining what constitutes reasonable care involves a 
balancing of the risk of an accident, the costs to avoid that accident, 
and the potential harm from the accident.3°O Therefore, the standard 
of reasonableness associated with negligence typically precludes re-
covery where the defendant's activity is important to society301 or 
where the defendant has complied with industry standards. 302 
In addition, because plaintiffs bring environmental suits on ac-
count of the defendant's past activity that has recently become a 
problem, courts must decide whether the defendant's activity was 
reasonable in the past.303 Courts often lack the expertise needed to 
determine whether a particular activity was unreasonable in the 
past. 304 Activity that is unreasonable now may have been perfectly 
reasonable in the past.305 Determining a clear standard of reason-
ableness is almost impossible in light of the multitude of highly 
complex factors involved in an environmental suit. 306 For example, 
plaintiffs would have difficulty demonstrating the different levels of 
technology and options available to the defendant at the time of the 
exposure, not to mention the defendant's knowledge of any existing 
medical test at the time of the exposure. 307 
A battery cause of action, however, avoids the difficulties of bal-
ancing tests. The prima facie case for battery presents a simple 
297 See supra notes 223--88 and accompanying text. 
298 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
299 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 30 at 164-65. 
300 See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (court 
weighed factors such as probability, actual injury, and burden of preventing injury in deter-
lnining liability). 
301 See generally supra part III.B. 
S02 See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text. 
303 See, e.g., Dillon v. Acme Oil Co., 2 N. Y.S. 289, 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1888)(court considered 
it unreasonable to expect oil company to know, at the time of a spill, that the spilled oil would 
seep through the land and contaminate the ground water); see also supra notes 108-14 and 
accompanying text. 
304 Developments, supra note 26, at 1611-12. 
305 See Hurwitz, supra note 31, at 67. 
306 See Developments, supra note 26, at 1611-12. 
307 See id. 
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objective test, devoid of any sUbjective determinations regarding 
whether the defendant's activity was unreasonable in the past.308 To 
succeed in a battery claim, a plaintiff only need show that the de-
fendant intended to cause an unconsented bodily contact, and that 
such a contact occurred. 309 
Davis v. Du Pont,310 presents a scenario in which a plaintiff that 
lost on his negligence claim might have succeeded under a battery 
cause of action. 311 The plaintiff in Davis was able to show that his 
work environment exposed him to toxic fumes, and that he was 
suffering from liver damage caused by exposure to toxic agents in 
the workplace. 312 The plaintiff also was able to show that he used 
the defendants' products, which released toxic fumes. 313 He was 
unable to recover under a negligence theory, however, because he 
was unable to prove that the defendants' toxic products were the 
proximate cause of his liver damage. 314 
The plaintiff in Davis could have established a prima facie case 
for battery.315 The defendants caused a harmful or offensive contact 
by exposing the plaintiff to toxic fumes through the paint products 
the plaintiff used at work. The plaintiff could have tried to prove 
that the defendants acted intentionally by submitting evidence such 
as the material safety data sheet (MSDS) that was submitted to the 
district court. The MSDS showed that one of the defendants was 
aware that at least one of its products could cause liver damage. 316 
The defendant might have claimed that the plaintiff consented to the 
exposure by using the products for twenty-five years. The plaintiff 
would have been able to counter this charge by asserting that he 
just painted the cars and had no way of knowing twenty-five years 
ago that he was being exposed to hazardous substances. Upon show-
ing that the defendant intentionally caused an unconsented, harmful 
contact by exposing him to hazardous substances, the plaintiff prob-
ably could have recovered nominal damages under a battery cause 
of action. 317 
Once the plaintiff established his battery cause of action, he also 
might have been able to recover punitive damages to compensate 
308 See supra part V. 
309 RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 18. 
310 729 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Ark. 1989). 
311 See id. at 655. 
312 [d. at 654-55. 
313 [d. at 653, 654. 
314 [d. at 655. 
315 See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text. 
316 See Davis v. DuPont, 729 F. Supp. 652, 653 (E.D. Ark. 1989). 
317 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 9, at 40. 
298 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 20:265 
him for his liver damage. 318 The MSDS demonstrated that the de-
fendant marketed a dangerous product without warning consumers 
of its danger until several years after the product was first in use. 319 
Courts award punitive damages in similar cases where the defendant 
has acted in a way that is substantially certain to cause harm. 320 
D. Battery as a Solution to the Problems of Strict Liability 
Similar to negligence, strict liability requires courts to consider 
both the risk and potential harm from a defendant's activity and the 
defendant's ability to avoid the harm. 321 As in negligence, a court 
will deny a plaintiff recovery in a strict liability action where society 
values the defendant's activity more highly than it values the plain-
tiff's right to be left alone. 322 Some courts, however, may be reluc-
tant to impose liability without fault on a defendant who may have 
been unable to prevent the damage. 323 
In strict liability actions, courts also consider the appropriateness 
and value of the defendant's activity to the community.324 For ex-
ample, Utah courts have found defendants strictly liable for damages 
from water storage used in oil production,325 while courts in the oil-
producing state of Texas have refused to find defendants strictly 
liable for damages from stored water used in oil production. 326 Re-
covery in strict liability can be uncertain because a strict liability 
cause of action requires courts to make a subjective determination 
of whether the defendant's activity is abnormally dangerous because 
of the place where it is conducted. 327 
A battery action, however, does not consider the place where the 
complained of activity occurred. The right to the inviolability of the 
body extends to everyone, regardless of where they live. Further-
more, battery is an intentional tort. A court that is reluctant to hold 
318 See supra part V.C. 
319 See Davis, 729 F. Supp. at 653. There may be a problem with using this MSDS if the 
court finds that it is barred under Federal Rule of Evidence 407 as a subsequent remedial 
measure. The court in Davis, however, did not state that the MSDS necessarily would be 
inadmissible. I d. 
320 See Roeca, supra note 247, at 516. 
321 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 520. 
322 See supra part III. C. 
323 See William R. Ginsberg & Lois Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A 
Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 920 (1981). 
324 RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 520. 
325 Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267,275 (Utah 1982). 
326 Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221, 226 (Tex. 1936). 
327 See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text. 
1993] TOXIC TORTS 299 
defendants strictly liable for their activity without considering their 
fault may be more receptive to a battery cause of action, which gives 
weight to the defendant's fault by requiring plaintiffs to prove in-
tent. 328 
E. Battery as a Solution to the Problem of 
Workers' Compensation 
Even though most plaintiffs in toxic tort cases may choose which 
cause of action is best suited for winning them the largest amount 
of personal injury damages, employees do not have this luxury when 
they try to recover damages from their employers. The exclusivity 
provision in workers' compensation statutes bar workers' common 
law actions against their employers for injuries arising out of work-
place accidents. 329 Where workers' compensation covers the injured 
worker, the problem is the low amount of damages available through 
the workers' compensation system.330 A battery cause of action may 
enable an injured worker to recover the higher damage awards 
available at common law through the "intentional act" exception to 
the exclusivity provision. Plaintiffs bring battery actions to recover 
damages for intentional acts. Because an intentional act cannot be 
the cause of accidental injury, employees in some jurisdictions can 
sue their employers in battery and escape the workers' compensation 
bar. 331 Courts imply this intentional tort exception to workers' com-
pensation where the statute in question does not explicitly provide 
for an exception. 332 
In cases of occupational disease resulting from exposure to haz-
ardous substances, it may be in an employee's best interest to seek 
a remedy outside of the workers' compensation system. Fighting an 
employer's challenge to a workers' compensation claim can be a 
costly endeavor, even if the worker does win.333 Employer challenges 
to claims for occupational disease have converted a nonadversarial 
system into a system plagued by the same delays as traditional 
litigation. 334 Due to the high rate of challenges by employers to 
328 See supra note 320, 203-18 and accompanying text. 
329 See Occupational Disease, supra note 21, at 917. 
330 See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text. 
331 See id. at 157. 
332 See generally id. at 158-63 (discussing application of implied and statutory exceptions to 
workers' compensation). 
333 Barth, supra note 173, at 571. 
334 See id. 
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workers' compensation claims for occupational disease,335 the swift 
and guaranteed recoveries that were supposed to justify the lower 
awards have disappeared.336 Moreover, when the employee does win 
compensation, it is at a lower level than would be possible at common 
law. 337 
Injured workers may decide that if they must fight with their 
employers over the issue of what caused their disease, they might 
as well recover the higher damages available at common law. Ar-
guing that an occupational disease arose out of and during the course 
of employment, and not some other course of conduct, is similar to 
arguing that a defendant's activity and not some other factor or 
natural occurrence caused a plaintiff's disease. The primary differ-
ence is that by winning the first argument the worker recovers only 
the reduced damages available under workers' compensation, 
whereas by winning the second argument the plaintiff can win the 
greater damages available at common law. 
To ensure that the injured worker is able to recover these greater 
damages, the worker must proceed against the employer under a 
cause of action that avoids the exclusivity provision of workers' 
compensation. Battery, because it is an intentional tort, is a cause 
of action that would allow the injured worker to escape the exclu-
sivity bar of workers' compensation. Although only a minority of 
jurisdictions accept the intentional tort exception to the workers' 
compensation bar, there is a growing trend towards employees re-
covering from their employers in intentional tort actions. 338 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Battery as a toxic tort theory presents plaintiffs in hazardous 
substance litigation with a unique opportunity to recover damages. 
A battery cause of action offers potential solutions to the problems 
of causation, property ownership, and various torts' standards of 
reasonableness. This is not to say, however, that battery actions do 
not have their own weaknesses. Courts may be troubled by the 
intent element, or the avoidance of causation issues through an 
award of punitive damages on top of nominal damages, or simply 
the novelty of using battery as a toxic tort. A battery cause of action 
S35 See Occupational Disease, supra note 21, at 923. 
336 [d., at 925. 
337 See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text. 
338 Nothstein, supra note 14, at 168. 
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does present at least a possibility of winning damages in an area of 
the law where personal injury damages can be difficult for plaintiffs 
to win. This possibility of recovery should be sufficient reason for 
plaintiffs to include a toxic battery cause of action in their claims for 
personal injury damages in this developing and uncertain area of the 
law. 
